Nawaz Sharif Flew to The US despite the refusal of Clinton in 1999

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The Clinton Tapes, A President’s Secret Diary (Simon & Schuster, 2009) is an unusual tapestry of history, granting the reader a rare glimpse of eight years of the Clinton administration.

https://youtu.be/qdo0LrbKmko
Video explains the role of Nawaz Sharif during Kargil War.
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On Pages 560-561 of the book comes the zinger on Nawaz Sharif, a meeting that ended the Kargil War and saved thousands of lives on the Indian and Pakistani sides.

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Clinton told Branch that he had not invited Sharif to Washington. ‘Sharif had invited himself to Washington and Clinton had explicitly told him not to come,’ Branch writes.

Former U.S president Bill Clinton told Branch that he had not invited Sharif to Washington. ‘Sharif had invited himself to Washington and Clinton had explicitly told him not to come,’ Branch writes.

After Sharif flew to Washington, ignoring Clinton’s advice, the president cancelled some of his July 4 engagements. Remember, Americans like to take the day off and celebrate their Independence Day.

He refused to receive Sharif at the White House, and met the Pakistani prime minister in the library at Blair House, across the street from his home.

‘Clinton put his position bluntly,’ Branch writes, ‘If Sharif withdrew Pakistani troops from Kashmir, the United States would express relief without praise. If Sharif refused to withdraw, the United States would be forced to shift its historic alliance with Pakistan publicly towards India.’

‘For hours, said the president, Sharif’s delegation invented trick language to suggest that Clinton somehow blessed a Pakistani withdrawal.’

‘Or that Pakistan itself need not need to withdraw, because the fighters in Kashmir were really mujahideen fighters disguised as soldiers rather than vice versa,’ Branch recalled.

Angered by Sharif’s obstinancy, Clinton asked aides on both sides to leave and met with the Pakistani prime minister alone.

He told Sharif forcefully that the Kargil conflict was not a border skirmish, it had the potential to set off a nuclear war. When the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 occurred, Clinton said, the US and the Soviet Union had more information about each other’s nuclear arsenal than India and Pakistan had in 1999.

Your brinkmanship, Clinton told Sharif, could set off nuclear exchanges.

Sharif was relentless. Surrender for him, he told Clinton, was worse for him than war. Nawaz Sharif who travelled to the U.S. along with his whole family was insisting that if he would go back to Pakistan, the extremist Pakistanis would kill him and his family.

He could either order a nuclear war as a patriot, Branch wrote, or risk being overthrown by Pakistan’s army chief, General Pervez Musharraf.

Kargil was Musharraf’s handiwork, but the Pakistani people would not tolerate a withdrawal from Kargil.

‘Sharif could yield to Clinton only by baring his neck to Musharraf,’ Clinton told Branch of their exchange.

So be it, Clinton said. Sharif, as head of the government, would have to withdraw, and cover himself however he could.

Clinton told Branch that ‘their argument, which consumed Independence Day, was his most ferocious encounter in politics — bar none.’

Three months and eight days after his meeting with Clinton — that resulted in the end of the Kargil War — Nawaz Sharif was overthrown by General Pervez Musharraf in a coup.